The conventional result of the theory of the public enforcement of law is that wrongful convictions of innocents are detrimental to deterrence. This proposition has been challenged recently. In some cases, wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence, because they influence equally the innocent and the guilty. Therefore deterrence does not change. We show that, in general, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence. We prove that wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence only in very limited circumstances or under unlikely assumptions.
expected payoffs of staying honest. On balance, an increment in either prob decreases deterrence. Therefore, Png makes two relevant points: (i) wrong victions (and not only wrongful acquittals) diminish deterrence; and (ii) w convictions and wrongful acquittals are equally bad in their effect on deterr the margin, one further wrongful conviction induces as many individuals to behavior from compliance to noncompliance as one further wrongful acquitt
In a provocative paper, Lando (2006) questions the conventional result theory of the public enforcement of law that wrongful convictions of inno detrimental to deterrence. He distinguishes between mistakes of act and m of identity, and claims that, for the latter, wrongful convictions do not jeo deterrence. Mistakes of act happen when somebody is convicted for a crime not actually happen. As an example, Lando points to the case of speeding where the police fail to report the actual speed correctly because of meas errors. But it could be also the case for insider trading in corporate crim or tacit collusion in antitrust law.3 These are typically cases for which the p question faced by the court is whether or not there was any actual crim potential crimes are difficult to prove because there is no evident "smokin Mistakes of identity happen when one individual is punished for a crime com by somebody else. In the context of evident crimes, such as murders and ro the wrong person can be incriminated for an act that actually did happen.
The novel argument proposed by Lando is the following. When mista identity happen, and also when criminals can be punished for the crimes of then the expected returns to not committing the crime decrease equally for the and for the criminal. Thus, individuals do not switch behavior; in other deterrence is not jeopardized. In the present paper, we show that Lando's c only be true in very limited circumstances or under unlikely assumption generally, it is realistic to suppose that wrongful convictions do lower deter suggested by the conventional literature.
A numerical example is illustrative. Suppose the probability of convic a criminal is 0.5 and the fine is fifty dollars. The expected fine is twenty-fiv Everyone who derives a benefit higher than twenty-five dollars from com a crime is not deterred.
The idea developed by Png is the following. Suppose the probability of conviction of an innocent is 0.1. The expected fine paid by an innocent is five dollars. As a consequence, anyone who derives a benefit higher than twenty dollars (twentyfive dollars minus five dollars) from committing a crime is not deterred. Deterrence has been diminished as a consequence of wrongful convictions.
2 In this stream of literature one should also mention the work of Ehrlich (1982) , who suggested the hypothesis that the conviction of the innocent may increase (instead of decrease) deterrence if such conviction is perceived by other imperfectly informed would-be offenders in society as a correct conviction of a guilty individual.
3 A wise stock investment may be misread as insider trading, a certain competitivemarket equilibrium may be misunderstood as tacit collusion, and a suicide may be mistaken for a homicide.
The point raised by Lando is that the example we have develope only to mistakes of act. When we consider mistakes of identity, also be wrongfully convicted. The expected fine of five dollars i innocents and guilty equally. As a consequence, the threshold is s dollars, and deterrence has not been jeopardized. His conclusion i assumption that the probability of a mistake of identity spreads thi population of both innocent and guilty individuals (whereas mis concern innocents).
However, an important implication of the existence of mistakes been overlooked. For every wrongful conviction (of either an innoce dividual) there must be a wrongful acquittal of a factually guilty ind words, for mistakes of identity, one must equalize the number of m number of crimes committed in order to balance the demand and th takes. We show that, in general, wrongful convictions do lower det the probabilities of mistakes influence innocents and guilty equally up because these probabilities of mistake of identity also affect wr Looking at our numerical example, we propose that if the probabili by mistakes of identity is 0.1 for both guilty and innocent, then t a wrongful acquittal has to go up, for example, to 0.6 in order to h tween mistakes of identity and crimes committed. As a consequence of rightful conviction is now 0.4, and not 0.5. The critical threshol dollars. Deterrence has been jeopardized as a consequence of mista In this paper we contest the idea that wrongful convictions do not di when we consider mistakes of identity. Notwithstanding, more acknowledges that wrongful convictions may still diminish deter reasons: (i) given the existence of a criminal opportunity, the re staying honest is reduced if others commit a crime and therefore i of a wrongful conviction; (ii) the conviction of an innocent often real wrongdoer is free, and this could further dilute deterrence being mistakenly punished for a higher-order crime induces the cr another, lower-order crime (a standard marginal-deterrence argume The paper goes as follows. Section 2 develops a formal model. Fi addressed in section 3.
The Model
In this model, there is only one type of crime.5 Individuals have to decide whether or not to commit this crime, and each individual can commit the crime only once 4 As to (iii), the result can be reversed if (as Lando argues) the choice is continuous and not discrete (the wrongdoer can tune the degree of care). Furthermore, wrongfu convictions might increase deterrence if correct sentencing for a given crime increases the likelihood of a wrongful conviction in the future.
There are different possible interpretations. There are crimes for which both types of errors can happen (such as the speeding example). Alternatively, consider two dif- 
Individuals are then tried in court and sanctioned subject to the two types of er wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals. Let b be the gains to the indiv from committing the crime, and s the sanction imposed by the court.
Let us define £1 as the probability of wrongful acquittal for a crime one committed (hence a conditional probability given guilt); e2 as that of wrong conviction for a crime that has not been committed (a conditional probability g innocence); and £3 as that of wrongful conviction for someone else's crime. last probability applies to innocents and guilty alike (hence £3 is an uncondi probability). Figure 1 summarizes the different possibilities from the viewpoin person A when there is another crime committed by person B.6 Notice that the game tree describes the most generic game and in princ concerns both mistakes of act and mistakes of identity. We confront her models, one where there are mistakes of act and the other where there are mis of identity. Mistakes of act are convictions for crimes that never happened thus for which there are no corresponding criminals acquitted. In this case probabilities of wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals are independent, thus an increase in wrongful convictions does not imply any change in the prop of wrongful acquittals. Mistakes of identity, instead, are crimes for which the w ferent crimes (one to fit mistakes of act and one to fit mistakes of identity) subjec the same social cost and the same probability of being detected. The result is again immediate from (1 victions of guilty and innocent cancel out convictions. Lando's intuition is that the victions also for other criminals undermines the conventional wisdom. If Lando's assumption is correct, then wrongful convictions have no effect on deterrence, while wrongful acquittals diminish deterrence. However, his insight neglects an important balance between mistakes of identity and actual crimes.
In fact, notice that while mistakes of act are convictions for crimes that never happened and thus for which there are no corresponding criminals acquitted, mistakes of identity, instead, are crimes for which the wrong person is convicted for a given crime, and for the same crime, a guilty person is wrongfully acquitted.8 7 Lando argues that these are the cases where the occurrence of a crime is incontrovertible; only the identity of the criminal is questionable. There are of course crimes that are borderline; think for instance of cases of looks-like homicides that in fact are suicides, or of unintentional losses that are taken as thefts (for which thus a mistake of act becomes a mistake of identity).
8 In the case of mistakes of act, the crime rate is overestimated, as there are more crimes than actual criminals. This should not be a problem as long as the population is sufficiently large. .»/ '% "»7 '% "7 '% ?/ Al; ?/ A% V "7
Therefore, if there is a mistake of identity, then t conviction (either of an innocent or of a guilty person)
Given this equality, we can equate the following:
(2) €in^ = e3n + £3(l -n) .
supply of errors demand for errors
The expression (2) describes the supply-demand equilibrium in the market for errors when mistakes of identity occur. Applying our notation, we also have that
Together, (2) and (3) determine n(s2 , £3, now analyze how the equilibrium is pert of £3. We differentiate both equations (2) E'dn + nde ' = de 3, dn = g{-)sds'.
By substitution, we get (4) -= g(-)* de 3 n + g(-)se 1
Clearly, from (4), dn /de 3 > 0 for all e2 and £3.
with the probability of mistakes of identity. Th likelihood of wrongful convictions increases t quence, the supply of errors has to increase for necessarily the number of criminals has to incre 9 We can easily generalize the model for the po conviction for x wrongful acquittals.
From (2) and (3), we can also see that the result obtained by L under a specific assumption. By applying total differentiation obtain dn _ g(')sde3 + ng{-)sde2 n + g(-)ss i
Therefore, in order to conclude that dn = 0 as Lando did, we would need to have ds2/de3 = -'/n. When the likelihood of mistakes of identity increases, the likelihood of mistakes of act must decrease in a particular way (namely, at rate -1 /n). There is no reason to think that such assumption is satisfied in general, and particularly in the examples offered by Lando.
Final Remarks
Generally speaking, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence unless some specific relationship exists between mistakes of identity and mistakes of act. The conventional result of the theory of public law enforcement seems to be robust to the possibility that wrongful convictions also affect criminals.
Refuting the generality of Lando's argument has important theoretical and policy implications. Rules of evidence, as well as other characteristics of criminal procedure, all seek to produce as few wrongful convictions as possible even at the cost of allowing many wrongful acquittals. If Lando's insight were of general application, deterrence-based explanations would be flawed, since wrongful convictions should be simply irrelevant. The pro-defendant bias of criminal procedure would have to be explained in other terms. Our model points out that Lando's insight is of little practical applicability. Therefore, our model supports the basic theoretical framework and supports the significant relevance of a growing body of work explaining why wrongful convictions are more socially costly than wrongful acquittals.10
